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Abstract 
 
This article explores important aspects of the relationship between political leadership 
and institutional power, comparing the different forms that presidential institutions 
have taken across the world, and identifying the relationship between these structures 
and social, political, and economic outcomes. Semi-presidential systems are 
distinguished from presidential systems, and within the former a distinction is made 
between president-parliamentary and premier-presidential regimes. Some scholars 
have argued that presidential regimes are less conducive than parliamentary ones to 
the successful transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, but the empirical 
evidence is contradictory. Recent research has, however, drawn attention to finer 
distinctions within the various broad categories of presidentialism, focusing on more 
precise institutional arrangements and trying to identify which are more, and which 
are less, consonant with the consolidation of democracy. 
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What is the relationship between institutional power and political leadership? 
What is the effect of presidential institutions on political, economic, and social 
outcomes? These are questions that scholars have debated for centuries. For 
many years, proponents of U.S.-style presidentialism were pitted against 
supporters of U.K.-style parliamentarism. Here, there were seminal 
contributions from Woodrow Wilson and Walter Bagehot in the late 19th 
Century,1 as well as an important exchange between Harold Laski and Don 
Price in the mid-20th Century.2 In the late 1980s and early 1990s this debate was 
revived with the creation of many newly independent states and the wave of 
democratization. At this time, many scholars warned against what they saw 
as the potentially negative consequences of presidential leadership on young 
democracies. Over the last couple of decades, though, the terms of the debate 
have broadened out and changed somewhat. In particular, scholars have 
begun to consider the pros and cons of what are known as semi-presidential 
regimes. Scholars have also started to look at institutional variation within 
presidential and semi-presidential regimes. This work has suggested that 
successful presidential leadership is a realistic possibility for countries in the 
process of democratic consolidation. 
 
When scholars debate the pros and cons of different political regimes, the two 
baseline categories are well known. Presidential regimes have both a 
popularly elected, fixed-term president, and a fixed-term legislature. The 
president nominates members of the cabinet subject to legislative approval, 
but the government collectively cannot be dismissed by the legislature. By 
contrast, parliamentary regimes are headed either by a figurehead monarch 
or by a weak indirectly elected president, who is often selected by the 
legislature. The legislature approves the choice of the prime minister, who is 
the central figure within the executive and who individually selects the 
members of the cabinet. The prime minister and cabinet, though, remain 
collectively responsible to the legislature. In presidential and parliamentary 
regimes, the institutional choices are very stark. For example, should there be 
a popularly elected president? Should the government be collectively 
accountable to the legislature? There has been a long scholarly debate about 
the effects of these different choices, particularly on the fate of young 
democracies. 
In 1970, the French political scientist, Maurice Duverger, challenged 
the standard presidential/parliamentary dichotomy. He identified another 
type of institutional arrangement that he labelled semi-presidential regimes.3 
These are countries where there is both a popularly elected fixed-term 
president and a prime minister and cabinet that are collectively responsible to 
the legislature. When Duverger first identified them, there were only a 
handful of semi-presidential regimes in existence, most notably France. Now, 
though, this type of constitutional arrangement is much more common. 
Indeed, in the late 1980s there were fewer than ten countries with a semi-
presidential constitution, whereas now there are more than fifty. 4  While 
Duverger’s general label has persisted, scholars have further distinguished 
between two types of semi-presidential regimes. These have the unwieldy 
names of president-parliamentary and premier-presidential regimes.5 Both 
have the basic features of semi-presidentialism, but under president-
parliamentarism the government is responsible to both the legislature and the 
president, whereas under premier-presidentialism the government is 
responsible solely to the legislature. The list of president-parliamentary 
countries includes Kyrgyzstan, Mozambique, Namibia, Russia, Sri Lanka, and 
Taiwan. The list of premier-presidential countries includes France, Georgia, 
Lithuania, Mongolia, Romania, and Turkey. It is safe to say that whereas 
previously scholars tended to confine their analyses of presidential leadership 
to presidential countries, now they invariably include consideration of semi-
presidential countries too and, indeed, presidential leadership within the two 
sub-types of semi-presidential regimes. 
 Since the wave of democratization in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
scholars have debated the relative merits of these regime types in relation to 
the transition from authoritarianism to democratic consolidation. Here, there 
has been considerable focus on whether presidential institutions affect the 
likelihood of democratic consolidation. At the very beginning of the 1990s 
Juan Linz framed the terms of the debate in this regard.6 He argued that 
presidentialism was a perilous choice for young democracies. At first glance, 
this recommendation seems highly contentious, because it flies in the face of 
the U.S. experience. After all, as the world’s oldest presidential regime and 
also the world’s oldest constitutional democracy, it might be tempting to 
conclude that presidentialism is well suited to democratic consolidation. 
However, Linz drew heavily on the experience of presidentialism in Latin 
America, where, at the time he was writing, democracy had not yet taken firm 
root. Subsequently, Scott Mainwaring built on Linz’s work, arguing that the 
interaction of presidentialism and a multi-party system was a dangerous 
combination for young democracies. 7  Again relying primarily on Latin 
American experience, he claimed that the difficulty involved in coalition 
building in multi-party presidential systems could threaten the survival of 
such democracies. By contrast, Matthew Shugart and John Carey argued that 
the popular election of the president was not necessarily problematic. 8 
Drawing on the distinction between president-parliamentary and premier-
presidential regimes, they argued that the former should be avoided, but that 
there were merits to the latter because premier-presidentialism allowed a 
degree of presidential leadership, while also maintaining it within certain 
limits. By and large, though, Shugart and Carey’s recommendation was 
overlooked. This is because premier-presidentialism can also exhibit what is 
known as ‘cohabitation’. This is where the president is supported by one 
political force and the legislature is controlled by an opposing force. This is 
similar to divided government in the U.S.. The difference is that in a premier-
presidential system the prime minister and the government are also 
independent of the president because they have the support of the legislature. 
The potential for conflict within the executive and not merely between the 
president and the legislature was usually enough for constitution builders to 
recommend against premier-presidentialism and indeed semi-presidentialism 
in general. On the strength of these debates, by the late 1990s there was 
agreement that presidential leadership was likely to be problematic for new 
democracies. 
 In the background of this debate was the issue of political leadership 
itself. The institutional architecture of presidential and president-
parliamentary regimes seemed to render the choices made by individual 
political leaders highly consequential. Were young democracies safe in the 
hands of the individuals who headed such regimes? Could they be trusted to 
exercise benign, never mind beneficial leadership over their country? Would 
leaders who were brought up under non-democratic regimes have the 
requisite skills to exercise leadership safely, even if they wanted to? Scholars 
calculated that on balance it was more risky to introduce a presidential 
system in which idiosyncratic and potentially unpredictable leaders could 
exercise personal leadership than to establish a parliamentary system in 
which the prime minister was checked by party politics. They were also 
sceptical that placing checks upon presidential leadership would make a 
positive difference. After all, history showed that outside the U.S. frustrated 
presidents had a habit of calling in the military and/or ruling by decree and 
even here Watergate was still fresh in the collective memory. 
 This scholarly consensus against presidentialism had and continues to 
have concrete practical application. Many newly independent countries 
adopted their first ever constitution in the early 1990s. Meantime other 
countries embarked upon a process of major constitutional reform. More than 
that, Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins, and James Melton have shown that 
constitutional amendment is an ongoing process in many countries. 9 
Whatever the motivation, one of the issues that constitution-builders have 
invariably to address is how to organize both the executive and 
executive/legislative relations. In short, they have to make a basic choice 
among presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary systems. 
Previously, constitution builders tended to call upon individual experts to 
guide their choice. Over time, international organizations, such as the 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, have emerged 
with the expertise to provide general resources for constitution builders 
across the world. The academic consensus against presidentialism has been 
influential in this context. 
With the exception of Latin America where there is a very long history 
of this institutional arrangement and some parts of Anglophone Africa where 
personalistic leaders found it convenient to centralize authority, most 
countries opted against presidentialism during the most recent wave of 
democratization. In Afghanistan, local constitution builders did eventually 
opt for a presidential system, even though they were strongly warned against 
it by international advisers, including U.S. academics. The puzzle is why 
semi-presidentialism has become so popular in the last couple of decades. In 
general, constitutional experts warn against this form of government. This is 
because it can generate both strong presidential leadership when the 
president is backed by a secure legislative majority, but also because it also 
has the potential to generate confused lines of political authority between the 
president, prime minister, and legislature, and because it can result in 
cohabitation. The scholarly decks are truly stacked against this type of system. 
Even so, semi-presidentialism has often suited local decision makers. It 
provides a neat compromise between political forces that want 
presidentialism, usually because they calculate that their party will win the 
presidency, and those that want parliamentarism, usually because they 
believe that they are not strong enough to win the presidency but that they 
will stand a chance of entering a coalition government and sharing some 
executive power in that event. Mainly for this reason, semi-presidentialism 
has emerged as the regime of choice for many young democracies. In this 
sense, contrary to the advice of much of the scholarly community the 
opportunity for presidential leadership has spread around the world. 
Nearly three decades on, though, the question is whether there is 
empirical evidence to support the academic consensus against presidential 
leadership. Here, the situation is much more confused. Initially, scholars such 
as Linz drew on in-depth regional knowledge to back up their arguments 
against presidentialism. They pointed to particular examples to show that 
democracy had collapsed in presidential countries. Other scholars, though, 
identified counter-examples where presidentialism had survived. The same 
point applies to semi-presidentialism. This system is said to have suited 
countries like Mongolia, but critics have pointed to the problems that it 
created in other countries such as Niger. These examples merely show that 
the relationship between presidentialism and democratic collapse is not 
deterministic. The question, then, is whether presidential leadership increases 
the probability of democratic collapse. Here, the evidence is contradictory. 
The results are highly sensitive to the sample of countries under investigation, 
to the controls that are included in the equation, and to the statistical model 
that is used in the estimation.	   For example, based on a sample of 123 
democratizations from 1960 to 2004 Kapstein and Converse found that 
parliamentarism was more dangerous for democracy than presidentialism.10 
Hiroi and Omori looking at 131 democracies from 1960 to 2006 also concluded 
that parliamentarism was more perilous than presidentialism.11 By contrast, on 
the basis of 135 democratic periods from 1800 to 2004 Maeda discovered that 
parliamentarism was better than presidentialism over the long run.12 The 
value of the whole debate was called into question when Sing, with a sample 
of 85 countries from 1946 to 2002, unearthed no relationship between either 
form of government and the collapse of democracy. 13  For his part, José 
Cheibub argued that presidentialism is dangerous only if it is adopted in 
countries that were previously subject to military rule, effectively shifting the 
explanatory focus to the importance of history and away from institutions 
altogether.14 
Overall, after a quarter of century of systematic study it is still unclear 
whether presidentialism is more dangerous for young democracies than 
parliamentarism, or whether the choice of regime makes no difference to this 
outcome. Indeed, the same can be said about semi-presidentialism. There is 
some evidence that Shugart and Carey’s claim about the perils of president-
parliamentarism relative to premier-presidentialism is supported,15 but there 
is no reliable, replicable evidence that premier-presidentialism is either more 
or less likely to be associated with democratic collapse than either 
presidentialism or parliamentarism. Thus, after so many studies, in terms of 
the empirical evidence at least, the jury is still out. In one sense, this is 
unsurprising. The success or failure of democracy is conditional upon many 
different factors. Context matters. More than that, the scholarly debate about 
presidentialism assumes it is an exogenous factor affecting leadership 
outcomes. Yet, it is endogenous too. As Archie Brown points out in relation to 
semi-presidentialism, there is a “chicken-and-egg question about whether 
leaders and political elites in countries with a tradition of authoritarian rule 
opt for a strongly presidentialized semi-presidentialism, leading to an 
excessive concentration of power in the hands of the chief executive”.16 Faced 
with such issues, scholars have started to unpack presidential and semi-
presidential institutions, and bring some consideration of both context and 
leadership back in. 
 
One of the reasons why arguments about the supposed perils of presidential 
leadership have been so difficult to resolve relates to the concepts under 
investigation. The presidential system in the United States is so familiar that it 
is tempting to think only in terms of the U.S. when discussing presidential 
leadership. Yet, there is a great variety to presidential leadership even within 
purely presidential regimes. For example, in Latin America, where the U.S. 
presidential model has been adopted wholesale, there are currently old-style 
caudillo presidents in Venezuela and Bolivia, whereas in other countries, 
including Ecuador, hostile Congresses have resorted to presidential 
impeachment to divest themselves of unpopular political leaders. Indeed, 
some authors have seen such presidential ‘interruptions’ as an increasingly 
common way of resolving political crises in the region.17 In Africa, where there 
is also a tradition of presidentialism, the ‘strong man’ president is still a 
model of reference, but even on this continent in countries such as Nigeria 
presidents have recently struggled to assert their authority over the 
legislature. In Asia too, there is considerable variation. In the Philippines 
there is a form of hyperpresidentialism,18 while in South Korea and currently 
in Indonesia presidents have had difficulty in passing their reform agenda 
through a divided legislature. What this all suggests is that while the U.S. 
may be the archetypal presidential regime, presidential leadership can take 
many forms. This is perhaps one reason why it has been difficult to identify a 
general association between presidentialism and democratic performance. 
 This point applies even more forcefully to presidential leadership 
under semi-presidentialism. Here, scholars are obliged right from the start to 
make a basic distinction within semi-presidentialism, typically between 
president-parliamentarism and premier-presidentialism. The difference 
between the two sub-types is purely constitutional, relating to whether or not 
the president has the power to dismiss the prime minister and government. 
While this is a constitutional distinction, it maps quite nicely on to the overall 
power of presidents in practice. Presidents in president-parliamentary 
systems do tend to be stronger than presidents in premier-presidential 
systems. Even so, the distinction masks important variation within each sub-
type. For example, Austria and Iceland both have purely ceremonial 
presidents and yet in both countries the president enjoys the constitutional 
power to dismiss the cabinet. It is simply that, by convention, this power is 
never used. So, they are president-parliamentary in constitutional terms, but 
their presidents act like figurehead presidents in parliamentary regimes. 
There are also differences in presidential leadership between president-
parliamentary countries such as Mozambique and Namibia, on the one hand, 
and Taiwan, on the other. In the former, presidents have been backed by 
dominant parties with a cohesive majority in the legislature. This ensures that 
the president enjoys the political resources to exercise great power. By 
contrast, in the latter President Chen Shui-bian was without a legislative 
majority for much of his eight-year term, limiting considerably his leadership. 
There is also the well-known case of president-parliamentary Russia. When 
President Putin was term-limited in 2008 he simply moved to the prime 
ministership, dominating the system from there before returning to the 
presidency in 2012. This latter example shows the limitations of an analysis 
focused solely on a consideration of basic separation-of-powers features. 
Under premier-presidentialism there is also considerable variation in 
presidential leadership. The list of premier-presidential countries includes a 
number of cases where the presidency is also a purely ceremonial office, even 
if the institution is directly elected. In these countries, which include Croatia, 
Finland, Ireland, Macedonia, and Slovenia, the practice of politics is purely 
parliamentary. By contrast, in certain other countries the president is usually 
the most important actor in the system. Examples include France, Turkey, and 
Ukraine. What is more, there is also considerable variation across time within 
individual premier-presidential countries. Samuels and Shugart have shown 
that cohabitation is almost unheard of in president-parliamentary systems.19 
However, in premier-presidential systems it is not uncommon. Here, when 
the legislative majority is opposed to the president, the president usually 
loses the opportunity to exercise leadership. For example, in France power 
shifted from the president to the prime minister during all three periods of 
cohabitation (1986-1988, 1993-1995, and 1997-2002). In Romania, President 
Băsescu faced two periods of cohabitation (2007-2008, and 2012-2014). On 
both occasions, the legislative majority voted to suspend him from office, and 
organized a popular referendum to decide whether or not he should be 
impeached. On both occasions, President Băsescu survived politically, but it 
was a sign that presidential leadership under premier-presidentialism cannot 
be taken for granted. By contrast, in Portugal the opposite scenario occurs 
during cohabitation. Here, the president becomes stronger. In Portugal, the 
president is not the party leader. Instead, when the president and prime 
minister are from the same party, the latter has more party political authority 
than the former. During cohabitation, though, the president is now the most 
senior party figure remaining within the executive. As a result, party 
opposition to the government expresses itself through the presidency, which 
becomes more powerful. 
What this all suggests is that a typology of regimes based on 
institutional design is a relatively blunt conceptual instrument. It may be 
possible to identify some very general trends about presidential leadership 
under presidentialism compared with parliamentarism and also, probably 
adjusting for countries such as Austria and Iceland, about the effect of 
president-parliamentarism relative to premier-presidentialism. Even if this 
were the case, though, and so far, as has been shown, the evidence is very 
contradictory, it would still miss much of the effect of within-regime 
variation. Partly for these reasons, the research agenda has started to shift 
towards new questions about institutions and presidential leadership. 
 
Some scholars have chosen to focus on the study of presidential power more 
specifically. For example, in a recent survey of articles in top-rated political 
science journals, Doyle and Elgie identified forty-nine studies that included 
an estimation of presidential power. 20 In forty-five of these studies presidential 
power was operationalized as an explanatory variable and in thirty of these 
forty-five studies	  presidential power was confirmed to have had a significant 
effect on the outcome under investigation. What is more the outcome of 
interest varied considerably across the set of studies. Some authors were 
indeed concerned with democratic consolidation. However, other scholars 
were interested in the relationship between presidential power and outcomes 
such as economic reform, economic growth, the level and timing of 
privatization, protectionism, corruption, human rights violations, cabinet 
stability, ministerial portfolio allocation, the effective number of political 
parties, voter turnout, and so on. Most of these studies were conducted in the 
last few years, suggesting that there is an increasing interest in the effect of 
presidential power. 
This approach is consistent with some of the underlying logic of the 
more traditional regime-based inquiry. In general, presidents in presidential 
systems, and indeed president-parliamentary systems, are stronger than their 
counterparts in premier-presidential regimes, who, in turn, are stronger than 
their head of state equivalents in parliamentary systems. In other words, 
regime-oriented studies can already be interpreted as studies of the relative 
impact of presidential power. However, as has been noted, there is 
considerable variation in presidential power within each of these regime 
types. Therefore, if presidential power really is the variable of interest, then 
scholars have argued that it needs to be operationalized much more carefully 
than is possible in regime-based analysis. 
 The question arises, then, as to how presidential power is best 
measured. Typically, measures are based on a set of individual indicators, 
such as whether a president has the power to issue decrees with the force of 
law. If a president enjoys a particular power, then a value of 1 is usually 
assigned for that indicator. Otherwise, a value of 0 is recorded. The total score 
for presidential power is invariably the simple aggregate of the scores for 
each indicator. This generates a set of cross-national presidential power scores 
for individual countries. This methodology, though begs some important 
questions. What powers should be included in the set of indicators? Here, 
scholars make very different decisions. Some prefer a relatively small number 
of indicators, others include up to forty. Moreover, even if they include a 
similar number of indicators, they do not necessarily include exactly the same 
ones. In addition, whatever indicators are chosen, are the values assigned in 
each case determined by the wording of the constitution or presidential 
leadership in practice? The Austrian and Icelandic cases demonstrate 
especially clearly that constitutions can sometimes be an imperfect guide to 
political life in reality. So, there are serious concerns about the reliability of 
the measurement of presidential power. These issues have led some observers 
to question the validity of the exercise altogether.21 Recently, though, Doyle 
and Elgie have tried to maximize the reliability of presidential power 
measures by, in effect, pooling the scores of scholars who have already come 
up with such measures.22 They drew upon the mass of information contained 
in twenty-eight existing presidential power measures, reducing them to a 
single score for each country’s president. They were able to adjust for 
measures that appeared to have idiosyncratic scores for particular countries 
and provide some information as to whether or not there was general 
scholarly agreement on the presidential power score for any given country. 
This exercise suggests that there is now the opportunity to engage in 
the study of the impact of presidential power more reliably than was the case 
up to this point. All the same, it leaves open the difficult issue of within-
country variation over time. For example, on a scale from 0-1, the French 
president has a normalized presidential power score of 0.465.23 This figure is in 
the right ballpark intuitively. There are plenty of executive presidents in Latin 
America with higher scores as well as plenty of figurehead presidents with 
much lower scores. However, as has been indicated, presidential power has 
varied over time within France in the context of cohabitation. A single 
country score cannot capture this variation. Moreover, these scores are based 
on twenty-eight measures of the constitutional powers of presidents. This is a 
more reliable foundation upon which to base a study in the sense that no in-
depth country knowledge is required. It is simply a matter of reading the 
words in a country’s publicly available constitution. That said, it does leave 
the issue of the difference between constitutional powers and actual 
presidential leadership in practice still unresolved. 
More fundamentally, though, such presidential power scores can never 
capture the individual quality of political leadership. Working within the 
same institutional framework in the same country, political leaders can 
exercise leadership very differently. This personal element of political 
leadership is very difficult to capture. In fact, comparative scholars who 
engage in large-n statistical studies do not attempt to do so. For them, the 
impact of political leadership can be found somewhere in the error term of the 
equation. This is a natural consequence of the type of analysis in which they 
are engaging. They wish to make general statements about the impact of 
certain explanatory factors. Institutions, whether operationalized as different 
separation-of-powers regimes or presidential power scores, can be 
manipulated and the effect of institutional variation on various outcomes can 
be tested. By contrast, variation in individual political leadership cannot be 
investigated in the same way. This does not mean that political leadership 
does not matter. On the contrary, whether good or bad, competent or 
incompetent, honest or corrupt, political leadership will always make a 
difference in particular contexts. However, the study of both regime types 
and presidential power scores does not place the focus on such questions. 
Thus, while there is a growing interest in estimating the general effect of 
presidential power, and while there are now measures of presidential power 
that are more reliable than ever before, there are nonetheless still profound 
limitations to this exercise. 
 
Partly in response to some of these issues, some scholars have placed the 
emphasis on the importance of more particular aspects of presidential 
leadership. This work addresses head on one of the issues that has bedevilled 
regime-based inquiry. Why is there variation in outcomes within particular 
regime types? Specifically here, why is presidential leadership more 
successful in some presidential countries than others? This question was first 
asked in relation to Latin America. Here, most countries have a presidential 
system. In this sense, the broad institutional context is constant. At the same 
time, and in contrast to the two-party polarization in the U.S., most Latin 
American countries also have multi-party systems. Therefore, presidents 
often come to power without the backing of majority support in the 
legislature. They are minority presidents. Indeed, this was the difficult 
combination for democratic consolidation that Scott Mainwaring identified in 
the mid-1990s. More than that, and in this regard there are similarities with 
the U.S., political parties in Latin America often lack cohesion in the 
legislature. Parties are not loyal to the president. There is party switching, as 
deputies shift their allegiance from one party or coalition to another. In other 
words, even if the president has the nominal support of a particular party or 
coalition, such support cannot be taken for granted. In this context why have 
some minority presidents been more successful than others? For example, in 
Brazil both President Fernando Henrique Cardoso and President Lula were 
able to pass reforms through Congress, even though their own party did not 
have a majority there. By contrast, in Ecuador presidents have been stifled in 
their ambitions, with President Abdalá Bucaram even being dismissed by 
Congress from office in 1997 on the grounds that he was mentally unfit to 
rule. To put it another way, why have some presidents been more successful 
at building legislative coalitions than others? The attempt to find an answer to 
this question has generated a literature on so-called ‘coalitional 
presidentialism’. 
 The work on coalitional presidentialism (or presidencialismo de coalizão) 
has its roots in the study of Brazil. Here, there were repeated periods of 
democracy followed by democratic collapse. However, since democracy was 
reinstated in the late 1980s, it has survived. At least in part, this success has 
been put down to the success of presidential coalition building. According to 
Timothy Power, the “core insight of coalitional presidentialism is that 
presidents must behave like European prime ministers. Executives must 
fashion multiparty cabinets and voting blocs on the floor of the legislature.”24 
In this regard, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso wrote what has been 
described as a “user’s manual” for other presidents to follow.25 
While the study of coalitional presidentialism is rooted in the Brazilian 
experience, it has struck a chord with scholars of the region generally. For 
example, Carlos Pereira and Marcus André Melo argue that the success of 
coalitional presidentialism can be attributed to three factors: 1) whether the 
president is constitutionally strong, 2) whether the president has “goods” to 
trade in order to attract and keep coalition partners, and 3) whether there are 
institutionalized and effective checks on presidential actions.26 For them, it is 
important that presidents have the constitutional power to distribute political 
goods, such as cabinet posts, and budgetary resources. Presidents can use 
these goods in the form of “selective incentives” to reward and/or punish 
members of the legislature. In a form of politics that would be familiar to U.S. 
observers, coalitional presidentialism relies on the president’s ability to be 
able to distribute ‘pork’ to members of Congress. At the same time, though, it 
is also important for there to be checks on the president’s power, including an 
active and independent judiciary, and a plural media. For his part, Steven 
Levitsky emphasizes a slightly different combination of factors to explain the 
success of presidential coalition building. 27  For him, the three important 
aspects are 1.) the sharing of executive power through the distribution of 
cabinet seats to coalition parties, 2) pork, budgetary clientelism, and other 
discretionary side payments, and 3) the presence of oversized coalitions to 
compensate for the lack of party cohesion.28 Levitsky thinks of these factors as 
informal institutional rules, taking the focus of the analysis even further away 
from the regime-based inquiry of the early 1990s. 
 The work on coalition presidentialism in Latin America has proved 
popular because it is potentially transferable to the study of presidential 
leadership in other regions. This has led to an interest in the so-called 
‘executive toolbox’, or ‘presidential toolkit’ approach.29  For example, Paul 
Chaisty, Nic Cheeseman, and Timothy Power have extended the logic of 
coalitional presidentialism to Africa, and countries in the former Soviet 
Union. They wish to argue that presidents have a range of tools that they can 
draw upon to engage in successful coalition building, and that the particular 
tools they use will vary according to the local context. Specifically, they 
identify five key tools for constructing legislative coalitions: agenda power, 
budgetary authority, cabinet management, partisan powers, and informal 
institutions, though they acknowledge that other tools might be appropriate 
in other contexts still. For example, they show that many African presidents 
have failed to command the support of a natural majority in the legislature.  
Faced with this problem and citing Benin as an example, they show how 
presidents there have had little choice but “to engage in complex processes of 
alliance formation, appointing representatives of opposition parties to the 
cabinet”. 30  This has meant, though, that presidents in Benin have been 
constrained in their exercise of power. For example, they have not always 
been able to monopolize control over economic rents and public policy. 
Instead, like President Kibaki in Kenya, presidents in Benin have “blended 
cabinet management, informal institutions, and agenda power into a single 
coherent strategy for coalition management”.31 Indeed, this example shows 
how the presidential toolkit does not simply manage itself. Skilful leaders 
have to decide a strategy for manipulating it successfully. This opens up a 
space for the study of innovative and resourceful political leadership. It is 
reasonable to speculate that such leadership is in fact one of the reasons why 
Benin has had one of the more successful democratic experiments in Africa 
since the early 1990s. In other words, even though Benin has a presidential 
regime and presidents have lacked solid support in the legislature, the 
judicious use of tools in the presidential toolkit by successive leaders has 
perhaps helped to maintain broad support for the regime, not least by 
bringing potentially oppositional forces into the decision-making process. 
 
How should we sum up the long debate about the relative benefits of 
presidentialism and parliamentarism? Over the years, this simple distinction 
has become less relevant, first with the rise of semi-presidential regimes in 
many countries across the world, and then with the scholarly focus on within-
regime variation and the study of coalitional presidentialism, and the 
presidential toolkit. The development of this scholarship is important not 
least because it indicates the need to go beyond the standard archetype of 
presidential leadership in the U.S.. Looking to Latin America for lessons 
about presidential leadership, Juan Linz argued that a key problem with 
presidentialism was the potential for conflict between presidents who failed 
to enjoy majority support in the legislature and the legislature itself. This was 
exactly the type of scenario that he believed was likely either to lead to the 
intervention of the military in an attempt to restore stability to the regime (the 
golpe), or to see presidents abusing the rule of law and governing by decree 
(the autogolpe). However, following on from work pointing out that coalitions 
are in fact relatively common in presidential regimes,32  the literature on 
coalitional presidentialism and the presidential toolkit has provided an 
explanation as to why presidential leadership in Latin America and elsewhere 
has been less destructive of democracy in recent times. Specifically, it has 
done so by shifting the emphasis away from blunt, regime-based inquiry, 
and, instead, has unpacked the concept of presidential leadership. This work 
is at once both consistent with and neglectful of the study of individual 
political leadership. Underlying the arguments about the perils of 
presidentialism was a distrust of individual leadership, or at least a 
scepticism that benign leadership was likely to be exercised in presidential 
regimes. At the same time, the debate about the relative effect of institutional 
structures on outcomes, including the debate about the effect of variation in 
presidential power generally, has been conducted largely without reference to 
leaders or leadership. There are signs, though, that the most recent 
scholarship is trying to address this issue more directly and yet still 
systematically. The logic of the presidential toolkit approach is that presidents 
have to choose which tools are best suited to the specific context they face. 
Some presidents are likely to choose well and others less well. Here, in the 
interaction of institutions, leaders, and context lies the eternal dilemma of the 
study of presidential leadership. 
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